Verifying this repository

You are being asked to run unknown code on a machine you may believe is compromised. That deserves more than a promise.

Signal	What it proves
GPG-signed commits	Every commit was made by the key holder. This is the direct counter to the campaign’s own backdated-amend technique
Attested releases	Each release carries a sigstore .intoto.jsonl provenance attestation covering every archive, the Windows zip and the .deb packages, so you can verify the file came from this repository’s CI and not from someone’s laptop
SHA256SUMS on every release	The file you downloaded is the file that was built
OpenSSF Scorecard	18 automated checks on the repository’s security posture, published so the badge resolves
CodeQL and Semgrep in CI	Static analysis on every push

Verify a release

The same two checks for any asset: an archive, the Windows zip or a .deb.

sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing
gh attestation verify polinrider-v2.2.0-macos-arm64.tar.gz --repo meSingh/polinrider-cleaner

The Homebrew formula and the Scoop manifest carry the checksums from that same SHA256SUMS, so a package manager install is checked against it too.

Verify the commits

git log --show-signature -5

The honest part

None of this proves the tool is correct, only that it is the code this repository published. The source is deliberately readable for that reason: the binary is one Rust crate with no dependencies, the indicator set is plain text files, and every behaviour is pinned by a case in the conformance corpus.